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Abstract
The policy debate views oﬀshoring as job destruction. Theoretical models of oﬀshoring
mostly assume full employment. We develop a model of task trade that allows for equilibrium
unemployment. In this model, there are two margins of adjustment. At the extensive margin,
moving tasks oﬀshore destroys jobs. At the intensive margin, due to higher productivity of
labor in domestic tasks it creates jobs. Exploring these conditions in detail, we identify
the potential of non-monotonic adjustment: Early stages of oﬀshoring always lead to higher
unemployment, while later stages may entail net job creation. We highlight this potential
through numerical simulations.
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Economic globalization has reached unprecedented “levels of resolution”. Due to advances in
the technology of communication and transport, international division of labor aﬀects ever ﬁner
slices of the value added chain. Increasingly, ﬁrms literally place bits and pieces of their value
added processes in foreign labor markets that oﬀer a cost advantage. While economists tend to
view this as a positive development that “leverages” the gains from trade, the public debate on
oﬀshoring is characterized by contention. During the past decade, oﬀshoring has been perceived
primarily as a cause of worker displacement and job losses.1 Workers view it as competition
head on from foreign labor to perform single tasks within their ﬁrms. Working for a viable ﬁrm
does not mean much in terms of job security, if the ﬁrm actively pursues international arbitrage
through oﬀshore performance of individual tasks. Moreover, job losses that form an integral
part of proﬁtable ﬁrm strategies seem more diﬃcult to accept politically than job losses that
come with the decline of ﬁrms, or whole industries, brought about by international competition
on goods markets.
Economists’ reaction to this debate has been to point out that, whatever the concomitant
circumstance of a job loss, if its domestic opportunity cost is larger than the cost of obtaining
the service from oﬀshore, then keeping the job would be forgoing eﬃciency gains from inter-
national division of labor.2 However, this message is diﬃcult to get across to people whose
presumption is that the opportunity cost of the job is zero since the alternative is unemploy-
ment. And it appears diﬃcult to sound credible with the message, if it draws on models that
rule out all unemployment. Indeed, given the public’s preoccupation with worker displacement
eﬀects of oﬀshoring, it must appear somewhat surprising that mainstream theoretical models
of oﬀshoring mostly assume full employment of a constant labor supply. In such a modeling
environment, all labor set free through oﬀshoring of certain production or non-production tasks
is smoothly reallocated to employment elsewhere in the economy, with no change in aggregate
employment or unemployment. Arguably, this assumption makes existing literature appear
1An excellent account of the tension between the academic view and the public and political debate on oﬀ-
shoring is found in Mankiw & Swagel (2006).
2See again Mankiw & Swagel (2006).
1somewhat disconnected from practical concerns. For the sake of credibility, we should therefore
address oﬀshoring with models that allow for unemployment, duly taking into account the direct
displacement from oﬀshoring, even if this seems unlikely to contribute much to the overall rate
of unemployment.3
Arguably, the most direct job displacement occurs when a certain task of a production process
is no longer performed by domestic labor, but is replaced by oﬀshore provision through foreign
labor. Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have developed a general equilibrium model in the
spirit of standard trade theory where a given type of labor input is composed of a continuum
of tasks and where the job displacement appears as an endogenous variation of the margin
that separates domestic tasks from oﬀshore tasks. The authors frame job displacement from
oﬀshoring as an equivalent increase of labor supply, assuming that this is smoothly absorbed
through a Rybczynski-type reallocation, with zero unemployment. In this paper, we place the
paradigm of task trade in a modeling environment that is less benign in two ways. First,
it rules out reallocation across sectors, and secondly, it features labor market frictions with
equilibrium unemployment. We thus directly address the concerns raised in the policy debate
about oﬀshoring.
The model also highlights a second eﬀect that stands against this fear of worker displace-
ment. This is the cost advantage, often called the productivity eﬀect of oﬀshoring. From an
economy-wide perspective, this amounts to a better exploitation of comparative advantage, fa-
cilitated by an expansion of the set of tradable goods to formerly nontradable activities or tasks.
Therefore, in a distortion-free world with full employment oﬀshoring should be beneﬁcial for the
economy as a whole, at least for constant terms of trade.4 However, it need not constitute a
3For descriptive micro-level evidence of job losses due to oﬀshoring, see NAPA (2006) and ERM (2007) and
the evidence reported in Mankiw & Swagel (2006). For a survey see OECD (2007). On the limited contribution
of oﬀshoring to the overall labor market turnover, see Bhagwati et al. (2004) and Mankiw & Swagel (2006).
However, Blinder (2009) calculates that in the future as much as a quarter of the US manufacturing work force
might be aﬀected by oﬀshoring. The general case for trade models with equilibrium unemployment is argued
forcefully by Davidson & Matusz (2009, ch.1). The case seems particularly pressing, if we look at trade in the
form of oﬀshoring.
4Intuitively, oﬀshoring means uncoupling certain pieces of value-added where an economy has a stronger
comparative advantage from other pieces where this advantage is weaker, or where the economy even has a (latent)
2Pareto improvement. Indeed, the bulk of existing theoretical literature addresses the redistri-
bution eﬀects of oﬀshoring. In a competitive general equilibrium setting with full employment
the factor price changes arising in a certain scenario of oﬀshoring may be derived from the
zero proﬁt conditions of a competitive equilibrium, once we know how this scenario disturbs
these conditions.5 Very often, the disturbance may equivalently be described as a certain form
of technological improvement. As demonstrated by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008), the
equilibrium adjustment of factor prices then depends on the factor- or sector-biasedness of this
technological improvement.6 In this paper, instead of investigating how the productivity eﬀect
of oﬀshoring is distributed across factors in a full employment world, we assume a world with
equilibrium unemployment and explore conditions under which it is strong enough to oﬀset the
worker displacement eﬀect.
We thus respond to the aforementioned need to address the concerns raised in the policy
debate on oﬀshoring. However, our analysis also responds to the need of an improved guidance
for empirical work. Attempts to use large scale cross-section and time series evidence in order
to quantify the labor market eﬀects of oﬀshoring typically focus on variations in aggregate em-
ployment (or unemployment) or wages.7 These are the joint outcome of both, the immediate
comparative disadvantage; see Jones (2000). For an extension of the gains from trade theorem to oﬀshoring, see
Markusen (2010) and Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud (2010).
5Depending on details related to assumptions about intersectoral factor mobility, the full employment condi-
tions may come into play as well. Most of the literature focuses on Heckscher-Ohlin-type models with perfect
mobility of factors across sectors. See Jones (2000) and Feenstra (2010). For a model assuming speciﬁc factors,
see Kohler (2004a).
6Their task trade model features two perfectly competitive industries using two types of labor. If lower
oﬀshoring costs lead to enhanced oﬀshoring of tasks performed by low-skilled labor, the productivity eﬀect is
equivalent to a Harrod-neutral technological improvement in the use of low-skilled labor. Provided the two
industries use the two types of labor in diﬀerent proportions, a zero proﬁt equilibrium with unchanged prices of
ﬁnal goods then requires a higher wage for low-skilled labor. By assumption, the worker displacement is fully
absorbed by reallocation of both types of labor between the two industries.
7For empirical studies, see Egger & Egger (2003, 2006), Amiti & Wei (2005), Görg, Hijzen & Hine (2005)
and Geishecker & Görg (2008). For an attempt to disentangle the productivity eﬀect of service oﬀshoring in the
US, see Amiti & Wei (2009). A recent paper by Wright (2011) looks at sectoral employment eﬀects of oﬀshoring
through the lens of a log-linear version of the Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008). However, the analysis is based
on the usual full employment assumption.
3worker displacement as well as the productivity eﬀect of oﬀshoring, and of the labor market insti-
tutions governing the equilibrium adjustment to these “shocks”. As will become evident below,
the results that we derive in this paper should be helpful also for improving speciﬁcations of
employment and/or wage equations that permit disentangling the displacement and productivity
eﬀects also in empirical work.
Before we proceed with our theoretical model, we must brieﬂy mention a further eﬀect of
oﬀshoring that has caused quite a bit of attention in the literature. In one way or another,
oﬀshoring is likely to aﬀect the output pattern. Therefore, a large country must also expect
a terms of trade eﬀect. Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have demonstrated that this feeds
back into factor prices via the well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In addition, it has welfare
consequences. Indeed, the terms of trade eﬀect may even wipe out the entire productivity eﬀect,
so that the economy becomes worse oﬀ through the technological improvement that drives
oﬀshoring.8 However, as pointed out by Bhagwati et al. (2004), the empirical relevance of the
terms of trade eﬀect of oﬀshoring seems rather limited.9 At any rate, it certainly does not
dominate the public debate nearly as much as the direct worker displacement eﬀect and the
productivity eﬀect of oﬀshoring. In this paper, we therefore focus on the worker displacement
eﬀect and the productivity eﬀect, allowing for labor market frictions that lead to equilibrium
unemployment.
Our analysis of oﬀshoring is not the ﬁrst to allow for equilibrium unemployment. The ﬁrst to
do so is Egger & Kreickemeier (2008), where international fragmentation is based on endowments
with two types of labor, with wages subject to a fair wage constraint that leads to unemployment.
More directly related to this paper, Keuschnigg & Ribi (2009) look at oﬀshoring in a model
8This is an instance of “immiserizing growth”; see Johnson (1955) and Bhagwati (1958). The conditions for
oﬀshoring to be beneﬁcial are identiﬁed, using standard gains from trade logic, in two recent papers by Markusen
(2010) and Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud (2010).
9An alleged negative terms of trade eﬀect has entered the center stage of public debate as a result of an
article by the late Paul Samuelson (2004). That paper was partly seen as pointing out the specter of harmful
oﬀshoring due to an adverse terms of trade eﬀect. However, while the scenario envisaged by Samuelson did involve
a deterioration of the US terms of trade, this was not caused by oﬀshoring as such; see Bhagwati et al. (2004)
as well as Mankiw & Swagel (2006). “Trade Disputes” in The Economist, Sept 16, 2004 and Farell & Rosenfeld
(2005) exemplify the broad attention received by this argument.
4where unemployment is due to costly search and matching. At the ﬁrm level, oﬀshoring is
modeled as a discrete choice between domestic or cheaper foreign provision of a speciﬁc input,
which requires only low-skilled labor. The choice is governed by a ﬁxed cost of oﬀshoring. The
worker displacement eﬀect appears as a continuous margin between ﬁrms that choose oﬀshore
provision and ﬁrms relying on domestic employment. Any reduction in the cost of oﬀshore input
provision thus comes at the expense of domestic employment through an increase in the share
of oﬀshoring ﬁrms, driving up unemployment of low-skilled labor. Importantly, by assumption
oﬀshoring ﬁrms hire no domestic labor at all, hence there is no way in which the productivity
eﬀect of oﬀshoring would ever lead to domestic job creation. All it does is enhancing earnings
perspectives of the other factor, i.e., high-skilled labor.
In Mitra & Ranjan (2010) a single type of labor is employed subject to search and matching
in two sectors, each producing a nontradable good. Technology is assumed to be Ricardian,
although in one of the sectors it involves two intermediates, each produced with labor and as-
sembled to the ﬁnal good according to a CES aggregate. Domestic labor is equally suitable for
production of either type of input. However, by assumption only one of these inputs is amenable
to oﬀshore procurement. Since output is linear in the input aggregate, the job surplus gener-
ated by an optimal mix of employment is independent of total employment. Wage bargaining
determines the equilibrium labor market tightness as well as the wage rate paid in either of the
two sectors as functions of output prices, but leaves relative sector size indeterminate. This is
determined through an arbitrage condition for the unemployed who must decide in which sector
to search for employment. Oﬀshoring reduces the minimum unit cost for CES input assembly.
For a given price of the ﬁnal output, ﬁrms ﬁnd domestic hiring more attractive, which increases
labor market tightness as well as the wage paid in the oﬀshoring industry. This is the productivity
eﬀect of oﬀshoring.
The important point to note here is that the model by Mitra & Ranjan (2010) rules out any
worker displacement eﬀect of oﬀshoring. Oﬀshoring per se never causes ﬁrms to shed domestic
labor, but simply leads them to post more vacancies upon realizing that the productivity eﬀect
enhances the job surplus on domestic employment which is smoothly reoriented towards the
non-oﬀshorable input. The downside of oﬀshoring comes only through the equivalent of a terms
5of trade eﬀect. Given that oﬀshoring is restricted to one of two sectors, it aﬀects outputs in
the two industries asymmetrically, and market clearing requires adjustment of prices in the two
industries. This counteracts the job creation associated with the productivity eﬀect. Depending
on the assumption about intersectoral factor mobility, it may even overcompensate the job
creation associated with the productivity eﬀect.
Obviously, the models by Keuschnigg & Ribi (2009) and Mitra & Ranjan (2010) are at
opposite extremes. The former rules out any job creation on account of the productivity eﬀect
of oﬀshoring, which seems overly pessimistic. The latter rules out the sort of direct worker
displacement that preoccupies the practical debate on oﬀshoring. Given that output price eﬀects
of oﬀshoring seem somewhat far-fetched, it thus risks being overly optimistic. In this paper, we
therefore explore the middle ground deﬁned by the coexistence of a worker displacement and a
productivity eﬀect of oﬀshoring, while ignoring the terms of trade eﬀect. Given what we have
said above, this seems the most relevant case. Our analysis adopts the task trade paradigm
of Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) where these two eﬀects are in sharp focus. Empirical
observations suggest that oﬀshoring depends on task characteristics which are more or less
orthogonal to the usual distinction between jobs requiring low-skilled and high-skilled labor.10
By the same token, almost all sectors of the economy employ labor that performs oﬀshorable
tasks. We therefore assume a single sector employing a single type of domestic labor, alongside
unspeciﬁed other inputs. The economy is assumed to be small, importing labor tasks against
exports of the ﬁnal good for given terms of trade.
Adopting this view of oﬀshoring allows us to go beyond existing literature in that we explore
the relative strengths of the job displacement and job creation eﬀects along the process of
globalization, as ﬁrms move from low levels of oﬀshoring, directed at tasks with low oﬀshoring
cost, to ever higher levels aﬀecting tasks which are more costly to move oﬀshore. Intuitively, the
balance of job destruction and job creation is likely to undergo signiﬁcant changes as this process
unfolds. We shall demonstrate that this may generate a non-monotonic relationship between
the level of oﬀshoring and the level of domestic employment (or the rate of unemployment) and
10See Spitz-Oener (2006) and Becker et al. (2009) for empirical studies that look at tasks performed by labor
with diﬀerent skill content.
6domestic wages. We also explore properties of the oﬀshoring technology that are responsible for
the relative strengths of the two eﬀects and for whether or not this non-monotonicity arises.11
We proceed in three steps. First, we derive what we call a “task-trade-adjusted” labor de-
mand curve which incorporates an endogenous adjustment of the extensive margin of task trade
in response to changes in the wage rate. The technology of oﬀshoring appears as a shifter in
this demand curve. In a second step, we then confront this extended labor demand curve with
a wage curve that represents labor market frictions in order to determine the equilibrium wage
rate and the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We derive this wage curve for two distinct
paradigms of equilibrium unemployment, search and matching as well as eﬃciency wages due
to shirking. This second step allows us to identify the precise condition under which the job
displacement eﬀect is dominated by the productivity eﬀect, meaning that oﬀshoring of tasks gen-
erates domestic jobs. With a view on the aforementioned empirical literature, we also translate
our theoretical insight into a statement that relates to observable magnitudes, and we discuss
income distribution eﬀects. The third step then turns to a numerical simulation that highlights
the potential of a non-monotonic relationship between the level of oﬀshoring and the level of
domestic employment. In doing so, we make a distinction between two types of industries based
on certain characteristics in their oﬀshoring technologies. With respect to the cost of oﬀshoring,
we call these “deep cost advantage” and “shallow cost advantage” industries, respectively.
2 Oﬀshoring with Equilibrium Unemployment
2.1 Task-Trade-Adjusted Inverse Labor Demand
Our model economy produces a single good using labor input, l. Output is generated according to
a production function, F(l), with F′′(l) < 0 < F′(l). For a constant returns to scale technology,
concavity of F(l) may be interpreted as the presence of a second factor, say capital, which is
ﬁxed in supply. A unit of l requires the performance of many tasks according to a Leontief-type
technology. Following Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008), we assume a continuum of tasks,
11Another model featuring a non-monotonic adjustment to increased oﬀshoring is the one proposed by
Rodríguez-Clare (2010). In this framework the rich country, which oﬀshores certain tasks, may suﬀer in the
short run, but then gains in the long run, when research eﬀort is adjusted optimally.
7indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Without loss of generality, we assume that for a unit-level of l the same
amount of labor is required on each of these tasks. Units are scaled such that the measure of
tasks required per unit of l is equal to unity. Thus, in order to secure a level l of the labor input,
a ﬁrm has to employ an amount of labor equal to l
  1
0 di. The labor required to perform a subset
of tasks, i ∈ [0,j] with j < 1, is equal to l
  j
0di.
Firms decide on where to perform tasks based on cost advantage. Tasks may be performed
abroad where ﬁrms face perfectly elastic supply of labor at a wage rate, w∗ > 0, or by domestic
labor with a labor cost equal to W. We make no distinction between intra-ﬁrm performance
and outsourcing of tasks to independent suppliers. Suppose a ﬁrm wants to secure an input
level l and it wants to perform tasks within the sub-range i ∈ [0,¯ ı] abroad. Then the cost of
these oﬀshore activities is equal to w∗l
 ¯ ı
0 βt(i)di, and the cost of tasks performed domestically
is equal to Wl
  1
¯ ı di. The term βt(i) denotes the extra cost caused by oﬀshore performance of
task i, over and above the amount of labor needed, if the task is performed domestically. The
function t(i) depicts the variation of this cost across tasks, while β measures the overall costliness
of oﬀshoring. For obvious reasons, we assume β ≥ 1 and t(0) = 1. Moreover, without loss of
generality, we may rank tasks such that t′(i) > 0. The oﬀshoring cost of a task is determined
by several characteristics, but for the sake of easy reference we follow Blinder (2009) in calling
tasks with low (high) values of t(i) impersonal (personal) tasks.12
For reasons emphasized in the introduction, we want to allow for domestic cost of labor,
W, to be inﬂuenced by labor market frictions and unemployment. One would expect that, up
to a point, the balance between the job displacement and job creation eﬀect of oﬀshoring does
not depend on the details of these frictions. It turns out that this is, indeed, the case. We
demonstrate this by ﬁrst deriving a relationship between the domestic labor cost, W, and the
proﬁt maximizing level of domestic employment, subject to the condition that ﬁrms engage in
cost minimizing task trade. We call this a “task-trade-adjusted inverse labor demand curve”
(TTLD), although the presence of labor market frictions implies that W may not be interpreted
in a conventional way as the wage rate received by domestic workers (and assumed given from
12See Leamer & Storper (2001) and Levy & Murnane (2004) for broader descriptions of the underlying charac-
teristics that determine the magnitude of t(i).
8an individual ﬁrm’s perspective).13 Subsequently, we specify two types of labor market frictions
that we may see behind W. The ﬁrst is the search and matching paradigm due to Pissarides
(2000), and the second is the paradigm of shirking and eﬃciency wage setting, due to Shapiro
& Stiglitz (1984). We ﬁrst proceed with our TTLD and turn to the two labor market frictions
below.
Cost minimization determines a marginal task, I, which separates tasks i < I that are
performed oﬀshore from tasks i > I that are performed domestically. The marginal task satisﬁes
W = βt(I)w∗. (1)
In order to arrive at a non-trivial oﬀshoring equilibrium with I > 0, we assume W > βt(0)w∗.14
We shall henceforth call I the (endogenous) extensive margin of oﬀshoring. Thus, moving tasks
i < I oﬀshore saves on domestic labor costs, W, and at the margin I these cost-savings are
oﬀset by the extra cost of oﬀshoring. Obviously, the extensive margin of oﬀshoring, I, decreases
with β, which measures the overall costliness of oﬀshoring.











Observing condition (1) on I, maximum proﬁts may be rewritten as
π = max
l
[F (l) − Ω(I)Wl], (3)





The term Ω(I) is well known from Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008). It captures the entire
factor cost savings from oﬀshoring. Obviously, Ω(I) = 1, if I = 0, and from t′(i) > 0 it follows
that Ω(I) < 1, if I > 0. Moreover, it can be shown that Ω′ (I) < 0 for all I ∈ (0,1]. The term
13See Kohler (2004b) for a similar approach where trade takes place in tasks that draw on two types of labor,
and where the focus lies on a task-trade-adjusted factor price frontier.
14The assumption of a cheap and perfectly elastic foreign labor supply is meant to reﬂect, albeit in a stylized
way, the doubling of the world labor force through the “entry” of China and India, as well as the ex-Soviet bloc
countries; see Freeman (2009).
9Ω(I) makes the entire schedule of oﬀshoring cost, t(i), an integral part of the technology. The





Denoting domestic labor demand by E, we may write E = (1 − I)l, and substituting this into







The right hand side of this equation expresses the cost savings term, Ω(I), as a positive eﬀect
on the marginal productivity of domestic labor. Concavity of the production function implies
that for a given level of I the marginal product of labor is falling in E.
Now suppose that, in line with the scenario addressed in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
oﬀshoring becomes less costly, ˆ β := dβ/β < 0. The ﬁrst order condition on I in (1) then
implies that there is an increase in the extensive margin, ˆ I > 0, such that oﬀshoring now aﬀects
additional tasks. Introducing elasticities ξ(I) := IΩ′(I)/Ω(I) ≤ 0 and ∆ := −[lF′′(l)/F′(l)]
−1 >
1, we may derive the following Lemma:15
Lemma 1: A lower cost of oﬀshoring, ˆ β < 0, leads to a upward shift in the task-trade-adjusted
inverse labor demand curve, provided that −∆ξ(I) > I/(1 − I).
The proof of this Lemma simply uses proportional diﬀerentiation of equation (6), setting ˆ W = 0,
and solving for ˆ E. In economic terms the interpretation is as follows. Holding the domestic labor
cost, W, constant means that the entire reduction in the cost of oﬀshoring is absorbed by locating
additional tasks abroad that are more costly to oﬀshore, until at the margin the relevant no-
arbitrage condition (1) is again satisﬁed. Introducing an elasticity ζ(I) := It′(I)/t(I) > 0, this
implies ˆ I = −ˆ β/ζ(I) > 0, if ˆ β < 0 as assumed. The worker displacement eﬀect then emerges as
−[I/(1 − I)] ˆ I < 0. We may also call this the extensive margin adjustment of labor demand, a
worker displacement eﬀect sparked oﬀ by less costly oﬀshoring. But in line with the elasticity
ξ(I) < 0, a higher margin I also entails a positive productivity eﬀect, which translates into higher
15While the term Ω(I) measures the productivity eﬀect deriving from oﬀshoring tasks i < I, the elasticity ξ(I)
measures the productivity eﬀect of an increase in the margin of oﬀshoring. It is straightforward to show that
ξ(I) < 0 for all I ∈ (0,1] and ξ(I) = 0 for I = 0. The term ∆ corresponds in absolute value to the elasticity of a
standard labor demand curve. Assuming constant returns to scale of the underlying technology, we have ∆ > 1.
10labor demand according to −∆ξ(I)ˆ I > 0. We refer to this as the intensive margin adjustment
of labor demand. Lemma 1 states the condition under which the productivity eﬀect dominates
the displacement eﬀect.
Of course, ˆ W = 0 is notional. The domestic cost of labor will typically change as a result
of less costly oﬀshoring. Depending on the frictions on the domestic labor market, the change
in W involves a change in both the wage rate received by domestic workers and the rate of
unemployment. We now turn to a detailed analysis of labor market frictions, ﬁrst taking up
the search and matching paradigm and then assuming a shirking environment with eﬃciency
wage setting. In either case, we shall derive a “labor market equilibrium ”(LME) locus, which
may then be combined with the TTLD schedule, in order to tie down the labor market eﬀects
of oﬀshoring. It turns out that for our purposes we may use a single LME locus representing
both types of labor market frictions in order to trace out the wage and unemployment eﬀects of
globalization in the form of a lower oﬀshoring cost, β.
2.2 Search and Matching
Suppose the labor force is equal to L, with an unemployment rate denoted by u and a rate
of vacancies denoted by v. Following Pissarides (2000), we assume that unemployed workers,
U = uL, are matched with vacancies, V = vL, according to a standard Cobb-Douglas matching
function. Speciﬁcally, the number of matches is determined as M (U,V ) = Lm(u,v) = Luηv1−η.
The parameter η ∈ [0,1] denotes the so-called matching elasticity. It is a key measure of the
labor market distortion in this model. Note that for η = 1 all unemployed would instantly
be matched without the need of costly vacancies. Given this functional form, we can compute
the rate at which ﬁrms are able to ﬁll their vacancies, q (θ), and the rate at which unemployed


















= θ1−η  (8)
In these expressions the term θ measures labor market tightness, θ := v/u. The ﬂow equation
describing labor market turnover follows as ˙ E = θq (θ)(L − E) − λE, where ˙ E measures the
11instantaneous net ﬂow from unemployment into employment. The number of employed increases
by the unemployed who ﬁnd a job, θq (θ)(L − E), while it decreases by λE, where λ ∈ [0,1] is
an exogenous rate of job separation. Setting ˙ E = 0, we derive an equation that describes the








As usual, there is a positive relationship between labor market tightness and total employment.16
Once a match occurs, the worker and the ﬁrm ﬁnd themselves in a bargaining situation. We
follow the standard literature in assuming Nash bargaining between each individual worker and
the ﬁrm. We leave the number of ﬁrms unspeciﬁed, hence we allow for more than one worker
being matched to any one ﬁrm.17 Nash bargaining requires derivation of the value of ﬁlling a
vacancy, which is the discounted stream of future proﬁts from the match. The periodic proﬁt of
a representative ﬁrm is the excess of output, F(l), over the entire labor cost, which is composed
of wage cost and the cost of hiring. The wage cost of domestic employment is lw(1 − I), and the
foreign wage cost is equal to lw∗βI
0t(i)di. The hiring cost is equal to κV , whereby κ denotes the
cost (in terms of output produced) per vacancy posted. Vacancies and employment are related
through an equation of motion which takes into account that oﬀshore employment is not subject
to costly search and matching
(1 − I)˙ l = q(θ)V − λ(1 − I)l. (10)
In this equation ˙ l denotes the instantaneous change in total employment, both domestic and
oﬀshore. Dividing by 1 − I, it becomes clear that frictionless oﬀshoring is taken into account
through a suitably scaled-up matching rate, q(θ)/(1 − I).








16Equation (9) can be seen as a standard Beveridge curve, but focusing on employment, E, instead of unem-
ployment, U.
17An interpretation of this assumption is that each worker negotiates with a diﬀerent representative of the ﬁrm,
aiming at wages that are consistent with simultaneously maintaining all matches; see Rotemberg (2006).
12The second equality derives from comparison with (6). This equation thus reveals the details
behind the domestic labor cost, W, if labor market frictions are as in the search and matching
model of Pissarides (2000). The representative ﬁrm’s rent that derives from ﬁlling a vacancy









Intuitively, the asset value that corresponds to a ﬁlled domestic job equals the ﬁrm’s marginal
product of labor minus the wage paid, discounted by the interest rate, r, plus the separation
rate, λ ∈ [0,1]. With free entry this must be equal to the hiring cost per matched worker,
κ/q(θ).
Turning to the value equations for the two states of employment or unemployment, VE or
VU, and assuming risk neutral workers, we have
rVE = w + λ(VU − VE), (13)
rVU = z + θq (θ)(VE − VU), (14)
where z > 0 denotes the outside option of workers, e.g. the money-equivalent of leisure. The
wage rate, w, is now determined by (generalized) Nash bargaining. Denoting the bargaining







The ﬁrst order condition corresponding to (15) states that
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j









where the second equality follows from (12). Substituting back into the workers’ value equations,
we ﬁnally arrive at an equilibrium relationship between the domestic wage rate and labor market
tightness









We call equation (17) the labor market equilibrium (LME) locus. Together with the task-
trade-adjusted inverse labor demand (TTLD) schedule in equation (6), it determines the equi-
librium wage rate, w, as well as labor market tightness, θ. Replacing for the domestic labor
13cost, W = w +
(r+λ)κ
q(θ) , and using the steady state relationship between labor market tightness

































It is easy to verify that the TTLD schedule is falling in w. As ﬁrms expand employment, the
marginal product of labor is falling, while at the same time the requirement of a higher number
of vacancies inﬂates hiring costs. Equilibrium thus requires that, other things equal, more
employment comes at the expense of a lower wage rate. Conversely, the LME locus is upward
sloping, with the following intuition: Higher levels of employment require posting additional
vacancies, leading to a tighter labor market and thus a higher cost of ﬁlling a vacancy. This,
in turn, implies a higher job rent for the ﬁrm. But with Nash wage bargaining workers and
ﬁrms capture constant fractions of the job surplus, and workers will thus receive a higher wage.
Figure 1 illustrates both equilibrium conditions. Interestingly, the level of oﬀshoring, I, enters
the picture only through the demand side shifting the TTLD curve up or down, in line with
Lemma 1 above.
2.3 Eﬃciency Wage Setting
Framing our model of oﬀshoring with equilibrium unemployment with the aid of a TTLD sched-
ule and an LME locus has an advantage in terms of generality. In particular, it allows for
interpretations of the LME locus along other lines than the search and matching paradigm. In
this subsection, we demonstrate that an alternative possible interpretation is eﬃciency wage
setting in a shirking environment, as proposed by Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984). We brieﬂy restate
the core relationships of this model that lead to an LME locus which is completely analogous
to (19) above. As will become evident, although it has a diﬀerent interpretation regarding the
underlying labor market frictions, in qualitative terms the labor market eﬀects of oﬀshoring are
the same in both models of the labor market.
As before, workers are assumed to be risk neutral, with an instantaneous utility that depends
14positively on the wage rate, w, and negatively on on the eﬀort level, ε. The eﬀort undertaken by
the worker determines the eﬀective labor input per physical unit of employment. For simplicity it
is assumed that the eﬀective labor delivered by a worker is equal to her eﬀort level, ε. Moreover,
the worker can choose to provide either full eﬀort, ε = 1, or else spend her work time shirking,
in which case ε = 0 and the ﬁrm has zero output. To prevent workers from shirking, ﬁrms can
monitor their workers, with a probability, p ∈ (0,1), of detecting a worker who is shirking. A
worker can lose her job for two reasons. The ﬁrst is to be caught when shirking, in which case
the worker is ﬁred. The second is that the ﬁrm is hit by a negative shock, in which case it shuts
down. This happens with a given probability, b ∈ (0,1), independently on workers’ shirking. In
the state of joblessness, a worker faces a constant instantaneous probability, a ∈ (0,1), of ﬁnding
a new job.
Under these assumptions, the value functions of employed workers (E) when shirking (S)
and not shirking (N), respectively, are given by
rV S
E = w + (b + p)
 





E = w − 1 + b
 




Note that we have set ε = 1. In these equations, VU denotes the asset value of being unemployed
(U), and r again denotes the real rate of interest. Workers refrain from shirking, if and only if
V N
E ≥ V S
E . This no-shirking condition translates into the following condition for an eﬃciency
wage
w ≥ ˜ w = rVU +
(b + p + r)
p
. (22)
The term rVU is the instantaneous (ﬂow) utility that a worker enjoys while being unemployed.
This consists of the unemployment beneﬁt (if any)18 plus the utility (in present value terms)
that derives from an expected change in status, a(VE − VU). In equilibrium, of course, VE must
be equal to V N
E . Writing z for the unemployment beneﬁt, we use rVU = z+a(VE − VU) together
with (21), setting VE = V N
E , in order to solve for VE and VU. Inserting the solutions for VU into
18In Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), this beneﬁt is interpreted as a minimum payment that ﬁrms need to pay workers
who are ﬁred upon being caught.
15(22), we obtain the ﬁnal no-shirking condition
w ≥ ˜ w = z +
a + b + p + r
p
. (23)
The model is closed by setting a so as to guarantee a stationary level of employment in a state
where there is no shirking. Observing that ˙ E = a(L − E) − bE and setting ˙ E = 0 yields
a = bE/(L − E). Inserting into (15) gives rise to a labor market equilibrium (LME) locus. The



















Note that the TTLD schedule now simpliﬁes, since the labor cost, W, coincides with the wage
rate, w. Moreover, the meaning of z is now somewhat diﬀerent from its meaning in the search
and matching paradigm. Obviously, this locus is upward-sloping, and the reason is as follows. A
higher employment level implies a higher steady state rate of job ﬁnding, a, which increases the
worker’s reservation wage and therefore also the eﬃciency wage that rules out shirking behavior.
3 General Equilibrium
We assume a representative household earning all domestic labor income, wE, and receiving
all proﬁts, π, made by domestic ﬁrms. Substituting from (2) and (11), household income then
emerges as












The household is assumed to spend all of this income on the ﬁnal good. Adding ﬁnal goods
demand from ﬁrms’ hiring activity,
(r+λ)κ
q(θ) E, we may identify export supply of the ﬁnal good as














Inserting for Y from above, we realize that the economy exports the ﬁnal good against imports




16We describe general equilibrium in terms of the extensive margin of oﬀshoring, I, and do-
mestic employment, E, as well as the domestic wage rate, w. These three variables are uniquely
determined by the ﬁrst order condition on oﬀshoring (1), with the labor cost replaced from
(11), and the TTLD curve in (18) as well as the LME locus, which in turn appears either in its
search and matching version (19) or its eﬃciency wage version (24).19 A remarkable property
of the model is that either version of the LME locus is independent of the extensive margin of
oﬀshoring. Lemma 1 thus gives rise to the ﬁrst core proposition of our model.
Proposition I: For search and matching frictions as well as for eﬃciency wage setting, equi-
librium adjustment to less costly oﬀshoring, ˆ β < 0, holds a rise in both, the domestic wage rate
and domestic employment, provided that −∆ξ(I) > I/(1 − I).
Figure 1 illustrates this result, combining the downward-sloping TTLD schedule with an upward-
sloping LME locus. The ﬁgure may represent either type of labor market frictions, although
strictly speaking the TTLD curve for search and matching is subject to a downward-shift, relative
to its position for the eﬃciency wage paradigm; see equations (18) and (24). However, what
matters here is a vertical shift that arises as a consequence of ˆ β < 0, and this shift is identical for
either type of labor market friction. The ﬁgure includes a schedule FOCO which depicts the ﬁrst
order condition on oﬀshoring in (1), with the labor cost replaced in line with (11). For the search
and matching environment, this schedule is downward sloping but has a ﬂatter slope than the
TTLD curve (at the intersection point). For the eﬃciency wage environment, the FOCO locus
is ﬂat. Of course, general equilibrium requires that all three curves have a common intersection,
whereby the necessary adjustment runs through the extensive margin, I, which shifts both the
TTLD curve and the FOCO locus.
Let us brieﬂy look at a scenario ˆ β = (β0 − β1)/β0 < 0. On impact, the change of β shifts the
FOCO locus but leaves the TTLD unchanged. Note that Ω(I) does not depend on β. But the
initial intersection point A now violates the ﬁrst order condition for oﬀshoring. The marginal
task I0 is cheaper to obtain from oﬀshore than through domestic labor. A cost minimizing
response requires shifting the margin to a task I1 > I0 which is more costly to oﬀshore than
19It is relatively obvious that existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium is ensured by the continuity and
curvature assumptions of the model. We assume that, given F(l), the oﬀshoring technology w
∗βt(i) is such that
a non-trivial equilibrium with an interior solution for I arises.
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Figure 1: Labor market equilibrium with lower cost of oﬀshoring
I0, but which is equally expensive with foreign labor as with domestic labor. This shifts up the
FOCO locus, depending on the slope t′(I). And it shifts the TTLD curve, depending on Ω′(I)
as well as on F′′ [E/(1 − I0)]. If the condition of proposition I is fulﬁlled, then TTLD shifts
up, and vice versa. Figure 1 depicts the two possible cases. Of course, since Ω′(0) = 0, the
condition can be fulﬁlled only for I0 > 0. Notice, however, that the level of Ω(I0) is immaterial
for the adjustment. What matters are the derivatives of the cost schedule t(i) and the marginal
productivity schedule for labor in production of the ﬁnal good.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the driving forces of adjustment, we now proceed
towards an explicit derivation of the comparative statics of employment, E, with respect to β.
In doing so, we focus on the the search and matching version of labor market distortions. In this
18case, the labor cost may be written as W = W(w,θ), whereas the LME locus may be described
as w = w(θ); see equations (11) and (17). For simplicity, we now set z = 0. Combining, we
write W = ˜ W(θ) := W [w(θ),θ], and we denote the elasticity of the function ˜ W by ω. It is easy
to show that ω =   + (1 −  )η, whereby   := γθq(θ)/[γθq(θ) + r + λ].20 Given 0 < η < 0 and







Ω(I) = ˜ W(θ), (28)
w∗βt(I) = ˜ W(θ). (29)
The ﬁrst equation combines the TTLD curve and the LME locus, whereas the second ex-
presses the relationship between the extensive margin of oﬀshoring I and labor market tight-
ness. Remember that labor market tightness is related to employment as expressed in equa-
tion (9). For simplicity, we now normalize the labor endowment, L = 1. We then have
ˆ θ = [1/(1 − η)][1/(1 − E)] ˆ E. Thus, the above two equations determine a general equilibrium
relationship between changes in β and changes in domestic employment, E. Proportional dif-
ferentiation of the two equations yields








ωˆ θ − ˆ β
ζ(I)
  (31)




ˆ β  (32)
In this equation, we have used the following deﬁnitions
α :=
ω















> 0  (35)
20For the eﬃciency wage case, we have W = w.
19It is easy to see that ξ (I) + ζ (I) = (1 − I)ζ (I)/Ω(I) > 0 and, hence, ϑ(I) > 0. Notice the
interpretation of the parameter α which is the elasticity of the overall cost of labor, W, with
respect to domestic employment, α := ˆ W/ ˆ E.
Given the solution for ˆ E, the remaining endogenous variables are determined in a straightfor-
ward fashion. First, the labor market tightness is tied to employment through (9) above, whence
ˆ θ = ˆ E/[(1 − η)(1 − E)] = (α/ω) ˆ E. Thus, the ambiguity with respect to ˆ E carries over to labor
market tightness, θ. The extensive margin of oﬀshoring follows in line with (31), which implies
ˆ I = −ˆ β (α/ω)/[ζ(I)(1 + ϑ(I))]. Unsurprisingly, ˆ β < 0 unambiguously raises the oﬀshoring
margin, I. And ﬁnally, the wage rate adjusts according to ˆ w = ˜ ωˆ θ, where ˜ ω := ˜   + (1 − ˜  )η,
whereby ˜   := θq(θ)/[θq(θ) + r + λ] is a share parameter which is closely related to   as deﬁned
above in relation to labor cost, W. All of this implies that ˆ w = (˜ ωα/ω) ˆ E. Note that ˜ ω is the
elasticity of the negotiated wage, w, with respect to labor market tightness, while ω measures
the same elasticity for labor cost, W, inclusive of the hiring cost. Both, the total labor cost, W,
and the wage rate, w, move in line with employment and thus share the same ambiguity with
respect to changes in β.
It might be argued that the elasticity ξ(I), which plays a key role in the above propositions,
is a somewhat arcane concept which seems quite remote from empirical quantiﬁcation. However,
the following proposition shows that it may be related in a relatively straightforward way to
observable magnitudes.
Proposition II: If we denote the domestic labor cost per unit of labor input l as d := W(1−I),
and the cost of imported tasks per unit of l as m := w∗β
  I
0 t(i)di, then at any interior equilibrium
level of oﬀshoring, I ∈ (0,1), an increase in the extensive margin of oﬀshoring, brought about
by a reduction in the cost of oﬀshoring β, entails net domestic job creation, if and only if
∆t′(I) > (d/m + 1)[t(I)/(1 − I)].
The proof is as follows. Taking equation (32), and observing that 1+ϑ(I)α > 0, it follows that
net domestic job creation will arise upon ˆ β < 0, if and only if ψ (I) < 0. This condition may, in
turn, be written as
Ω(I)
1 − I
+ ∆Ω′(I) < 0. (36)




















< −βw∗t(I)(1 − I) = −d. (38)
Rearranging terms and multiplying out by minus one, we ﬁnally arrive at the condition ∆t′(I) >
(d/m + 1)[t(I)/(1 − I)], which completes the proof.
Proposition II is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 which depicts the key magnitudes involved, looking
at the entire continuum of tasks with some initial interior equilibrium, I0, determined by an
underlying value of β0. For simplicity the ﬁgure assumes a linear schedule t(i). There are two
types of magnitudes involved. The left-hand side of the condition in proposition II captures local
“slope-properties”, meaning the elasticity of labor demand, ∆, and the slope of the oﬀshoring
schedule at the extensive margin I0, t′(I0). The right-hand side captures what might be called an
“interval-property” of the oﬀshoring technology, meaning areas m and d which are determined
by the entire shape of the oﬀshoring technology over the sub-range i ∈ [0,I0). The magnitude
of m, the cost of imported tasks per unit of labor input, is depicted by the shaded area DCBE,
while d, the labor cost of domestic employment, is depicted by the dotted area EBGF. Notice
also that the area ABC measures inframarginal cost savings from oﬀshoring tasks i ∈ [0,I0):
W0 [1 − Ω(I0)]. Proposition II is, of course, closely related to proposition I, but it formulates a
crucial additional insight in that it establishes a relationship between the interval condition of
net job creation and observable magnitudes. It thus also establishes a potential for improvements
of empirical approaches towards estimating labor market eﬀects of oﬀshoring.
How does oﬀshoring aﬀect the distribution of income between labor and the other factor
used in production who receives proﬁt income? Let us assume, for the sake of concreteness, that
there is a single second factor, viz. capital. Since a lower β unambiguously leads to a larger
overall labor input l, it increases proﬁt income π. Therefore, if the condition of proposition
I is violated, then oﬀshoring unambiguously increases the capital rental relative to the wage
rate. However, if this condition is satisﬁed, then both the capital rental and the wage rate are
increasing. In the appendix, we derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an increase in
21their search behavior. Equilibrium requires a no-arbitrage-condition in terms of the two sectors’
labor market tightness.21 This, in turn, determines a sector-speciﬁc labor force and a certain
output level for each sector, given ﬁnal goods prices. If the economy is large, or even closed on
ﬁnal goods markets as in Mitra & Ranjan (2010), goods market clearing will require goods price
adjustments, which may run counter to the initial adjustments. But as we have argued in the
introduction, signiﬁcant terms of trade eﬀects are an unlikely ingredient of an oﬀshoring scenario.
Within the present model, we may reinterpret the elasticity ∆, which captures the concavity of
production as capturing the terms of trade eﬀect, lowering the marginal value product of labor
over and above what concavity of production alone would imply.
Whatever the assumption about endogenous ﬁnal goods prices, an economy facing oﬀshoring
scenarios that diﬀer across sectors which, in turn, diﬀer in terms of the severity of search frictions,
the eﬀect on the aggregate rate of unemployment will typically be ambiguous, even if the sectoral
adjustment is unambiguously positive in terms of employment. This was pointed out by Mitra
& Ranjan (2010), and the reason is that the overall labor adjustment may imply reallocation
from low-unemployment- to high-unemployment-sectors.
A further generalization might relax the assumption of zero frictions in employment of foreign
labor for task performance in the domestic value added chain. Within the present single sector
model, this would be equivalent to introducing a terms of trade eﬀect in that any increase in
the extensive margin of oﬀshoring would lower the price of the (exported) ﬁnal good, relative
to foreign labor embodied in imported tasks. We may thus generalize the interpretation of
our rising t(i) schedule as incorporating search frictions present in hiring foreign labor when
extending the tasks performed oﬀshore.
4 Numerical Treatment
An important insight from the preceding analysis is that the relationship between domestic
employment and the extensive margin of oﬀshoring may be non-monotonic, meaning that for
low levels of I we have ˆ E/ˆ β > 0 (a net job loss through ˆ β < 0), while for a high enough level
of I we may observe ˆ E/ˆ β < 0. Whether or not such a non-monotonicity arises depends on how
21A similar condition can be envisaged for the shirking and eﬃciency wage paradigm.
23the local and the interval properties of the schedule t(i), highlighted in proposition II above,
vary as the economy moves from I = 0 to I −→ 1, driven by ever lower values of β. For easier
wording, we subsequently refer to this as the economy’s adjustment to globalization. Resorting
to numerical simulation, we want to shed further light on the potential of non-monotonicity.
Notice the diﬀerence between β and t(i) which capture diﬀerent aspects of the oﬀshoring
technology. While β measures the overall costliness of oﬀshoring across all tasks, the schedule
t(i) measures how the cost of oﬀshore performance varies between diﬀerent tasks. What is of
interest here is not the level of t(i) as such, but its slope and its shape in the sense of the above
mentioned local and interval property, respectively. It is relatively obvious that the shape of the
entire schedule t(i) should vary signiﬁcantly across industries. Our numerical analysis in this
section reveals that this variation may imply vastly diﬀerent patterns of employment reactions
as successively lower values of β drive industries from lower to higher values of I ∈ [0,1).22
Numerical analysis requires that we parameterize the schedule t(i). Accepting the notion
of a continuum of tasks and positive monotonicity of t(i), i.e., t′(i) > 0, it would seem rela-
tively innocuous to assume monotonicity also of the ﬁrst derivative. In this section, we make
this assumption. However, the sign of t′′(i) certainly seems ambiguous. Indeed, this is where
industries or countries will likely diﬀer. Perhaps more importantly, diﬀerences across industries
must be expected in the limiting behavior of t(i) as i → 1. Our analysis suggests a fundamental
distinction between industries where this limit is a ﬁnite number, and industries where it is
equal to inﬁnity. This distinction is of clear economic signiﬁcance. The former type of industry
bears a close resemblance to what Bhagwati (2006) calls “shallow” or “thin” cost advantage.23
In such industries, successive reductions in β may eventually lead to a complete dislocation of
all tasks. In other words, the industry as a whole loses viability in the domestic economy and
moves all its operations oﬀshore.24 By way of contrast, a case where t(i) approaches inﬁnity
22We acknowledge that a well-behaved equilibrium with I = 1 does not exist by specifying the relevant interval
as an open interval [0,1).
23We deliberately abstain from using the term comparative advantage which does not ﬁt a single-sector general
equilibrium model.
24As we have argued above, in our stylized single-sector-model an equilibrium with I = 1 does not exist, but in
a more general context, particularly one with labor mobility between several sectors, it certainly commands some
relevance.
24might be called “deep” cost advantage. Due to the highly personal nature of a sub-range of
tasks, domestic viability of this industry is more deeply entrenched, so that less costly oﬀshoring
as such will never wipe out the industry as a whole. In the following, we trace out values of ψ(I)
throughout the entire interval I ∈ [0,1) for alternative functional forms representing “deep” or
“shallow” advantage industries.
4.1 “Deep” Cost Advantage
The case of “deep” cost advantage is described by a strictly convex function of the form25
t(i) = (1 − i)
−σ , (39)
where σ > 0. Notice that a larger value of σ implies a higher slope as well as a higher degree of
convexity for the entire schedule. Given this functional form, the crucial term determining the
sign of the employment eﬀect of oﬀshoring emerges as
− ψ (I) =

   
   
−1 − ∆ln(1 − I)/[1 − ln(1 − I)] if σ = 1
−σ−1 + ∆
 
1 − (1 − I)
1−σ
   
1 − σ (1 − I)
1−σ
 
if σ  = 1 
(40)
Taking limits, we ﬁnd limI→0 −ψ (I) = 1/σ > 0, while limI→1 −ψ (I) = (σ∆ − 1)/σ ≷ 0 for
σ ≤ 1, and limI→1 −ψ (I) = (∆ − 1)/σ > 0 for σ > 1. Figure 3 looks at how the term −ψ (I)
behaves as the extensive margin of oﬀshoring increases from low to high values of I. Remember
that −ψ (I) > 0 means net job creation through ˆ β < 0 at the margin I. To anchor all lines at
a common unitary value for I = 0, we scale the plot to σψ (I). Obviously, this does not aﬀect
the horizontal intersection points which mark the turning points where the productivity eﬀect of
oﬀshoring turns into a vehicle of net job creation.
The principal message of ﬁgure 3 is simple, clear and important. If the oﬀshoring technology
features a large enough value of σ, then, monotonicity of t(i) notwithstanding, an industry with
“deep” cost advantage exhibits a non-monotonic adjustment to globalization, with job losses
at the beginning and net job creation at later stages.26 Notice that a high value of σ means
a high overall level of “task diversity”, meaning that the continuum of tasks spans activities
25This case is also brieﬂy considered in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
26In passing, it is worth pointing out that this pattern of adjustment may also lie behind the ambiguities that
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Figure 3: Oﬀshoring with “deep” cost advantage
that diﬀer a lot in the degree to which they require face-to-face contact or other features that
make oﬀshore performance costly. Intuitively, this should be conducive to high cost-savings,
Ω(I), from oﬀshoring and thus also enhance the potential for net job creation. However, what
matters for net job creation according to proposition I is the change in Ω(I), and not its level,
and this is governed by local task diversity. From ﬁgure 3 we learn that a higher degree of
convexity, and thus task diversity, makes the turning point from a net job loss to job creation
appear at earlier stages in the continuum of tasks. Moreover, given the monotonicity also of the
derivative of t(i), there can only be a single such turning point, if any. Intuitively, for oﬀshoring
technologies represented by (39), the prevalence of inﬁnitely costly tasks shields domestic labor
from such a scenario. Hence, once job creation from oﬀshoring sets in, it continues to dominate
the adjustment for all subsequent extensions of the oﬀshoring margin. However, while the
presence of a “deep” advantage shields from losing viability altogether, it is no guarantee that
have been discovered in the empirical literature that looks at the relationship between employment and openness;
see Felbermayr et al. (2011).
26oﬀshoring will ever cause net job creation.
Our discussion of proposition II has emphasized two types of conditions that characterize the
technology of oﬀshoring and are responsible for the labor market adjustment to oﬀshoring. We
have called these the slope and the interval properties, respectively, relating to the schedule t(i).
The functional form introduced in (39) has the disadvantage that there is a single parameter,
σ, that captures both the slope and the curvature of the cost schedule. To see what this means
it is useful to further dissect the elasticity ξ(I) into
ξ (I) = −ζ (I)Σ(I) with Σ(I) :=
  1
0 t(i)di
(1 − I)t(I) +
  I
0 t(i)di
∈ [0,1]  (41)
This clearly reveals that the slope and the curvature of t(i) are two distinct properties of the
oﬀshoring technology that determine the productivity eﬀect and thus the labor market eﬀect of
oﬀshoring. The elasticity ζ (I) is familiar from above, reﬂecting the steepness of t(i) at i = I.
We may also see it as a measure of local task diversity. In contrast, the term Σ(I) captures the
curvature of t(i) over the entire interval i ∈ [0,1]. In ﬁgure 2 the numerator of Σ(I) measures
the area DCBE, while the denominator is the sum of the areas DCBE and EBGF. Notice that
proposition I requires, loosely speaking, −ξ(I) to be large at relatively early stages of oﬀshoring,
i.e., for low values of I. Notice, moreover, that t(i) being strictly convex as in (39) implies that
  I
0 t(i)di comes close to its maximum only at late stages of oﬀshoring. But, if the schedule is
concave, then
  I
0 t(i)di may come close to its maximum (at I = 1) also for low values of I. In
other words, for a convex (concave) cost schedule t(i), Σ(I) is almost one at late (early) stages of
oﬀshoring. We now turn to a somewhat richer parameterization of this schedule that allows for
both convexity and concavity, and where overall task diversity is controlled for independently
of the shape of t(i).
4.2 “Shallow” Cost Advantage
To discriminate between slope and curvature we may choose the following functional form
t(i) = 1 + φiǫ, (42)
with φ,ǫ > 0. Although the slope of this line is jointly determined by both φ and ǫ, we may
still view φ as the slope parameter, as it uniquely pins down a ﬁnite value t(1) = 1 + φ. Since
27t(0) = 1, the parameter φ thus measures the overall degree of task diversity. A high overall
degree of diversity means that looking at the entire interval of tasks, they diﬀer a lot in terms
of the characteristics that make them more or less costly to oﬀshore.
Any given degree of task diversity may be associated with varying degrees of “task concavity”.
By this we mean that task diversity need not be spread equally across the continuum of tasks.
With a low degree of task concavity we mean that task diversity is concentrated among tasks
with a high level of oﬀshoring cost, and conversely for a high degree of task concavity where
it is concentrated among tasks at the lower part of the continuum. In the speciﬁcation (42)
task concavity is governed by the parameter ǫ, whereby ǫ < 1 (ǫ > 1) generates a concave
(convex) schedule t(i), while ǫ = 1 marks the knife edge case of linearity. Thus, the degree of
task concavity falls as ǫ rises.
Figures 4 and 5 give two separate illustrations of ψ (I), in order to highlight the role of
task diversity and task concavity for job creation and job destruction in the adjustment to




























As before, we want to anchor our illustration at −ψ (0) = −1. It is straightforward to see that for
any functional form of t(i) the term [t′ (I)/t(I)]ψ (I) approaches a value of one as I approaches
0. Hence we scale our plots accordingly.27 Figure 4 highlights variations in the overall task
diversity, while ﬁgure 5 highlights diﬀerent degrees of task convexity. Both ﬁgures use ∆ = 2, as
in ﬁgure 3. Figure 4 assumes ǫ = 5, which implies a convex schedule t(i) and thus a low degree
of task concavity. In turn, ﬁgure 5 assumes φ = 10, which implies a large overall task diversity.
The principal message of ﬁgure 4 is relatively easy to see. First of all, in contrast to the “deep”
cost advantage above, job destruction clearly dominates as I −→ 1. However, for intermediate
levels of oﬀshoring adjustment to further globalization is characterized by net job creation,
provided the overall degree of task diversity is large enough. For low task diversity, say with
φ = 0 5, where all tasks are about equally diﬃcult to oﬀshore, extending the margin of oﬀshoring
27This implies that we ignore I/ζ (I) = I
1−ǫ/ǫφ + I/ǫφ
2 > 0 for I > 0 on the right hand side of equation (43).
But this is inconsequential for our qualitative analysis.
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Figure 4: “Shallow” cost advantage and degree of “task diversity”
is always associated with a net job loss. Figure 5 is perhaps more interesting in that it explores
the role of task concavity. We observe a notable pattern of variation. For a concave oﬀshoring
technology (ǫ < 1), domestic employment falls monotonically with an increase in the oﬀshoring
margin. In terms of our discussion in the previous section, although for each conceivable level
of oﬀshoring the interval property is more favorable for a more concave technology, any increase
in the term Σ(I) that comes with a higher I is coupled with a worsening of the local property,
i.e., a lowering of ζ(I).28 The opposite is true for a convex technology, where the local and the
interval properties reinforce each other. In this sense, task convexity is inherently conducive
to net job creation over a certain sub-range of oﬀshoring. However, net job creation requires a
minimum amount of convexity. In ﬁgure 5, such sub-ranges emerge for ǫ = 3, ǫ = 5 and ǫ = 10.
These cases suggest a further noteworthy conclusion: While higher task convexity makes a non-
monotonic relationship between domestic employment and the level of oﬀshoring more likely, it
also postpones the range of tasks where this relationship turns positive to ever later stages.
28Notice the diﬀerence between the local measure t
′(I) and the overall degree of task diversity.
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Figure 5: “Shallow” cost advantage and degree of “task concavity”
In a nutshell, the insights from our numerical exercise may be summarized as follows: Task
diversity and task convexity both contribute to the likelihood that over a certain range of tasks
an increase in the level of oﬀshoring gives rise to higher domestic employment. But this range
of tasks is likely to follow late in the secular process of oﬀshoring.
5 Conclusion
Existing theory of oﬀshoring mostly employs models that assume full employment. Instead of
job destruction, these models stress cost savings from oﬀshoring which make domestic ﬁrms
more productive. Assuming domestic labor market clearance with ﬂexible wages and smooth
factor reallocation, oﬀshoring thus appears as a force similar to technological change, with factor
price eﬀects depending on the sector- and factor-bias of this change, and with a clear potential
of a Pareto improvement.
This is in strong contrast to the public debate where oﬀshoring is mostly associated with
domestic job destruction. We have therefore argued in this paper that there is an urgent need to
30readdress oﬀshoring with due emphasis on unemployment eﬀects, even though the contribution
oﬀshoring to aggregate job destruction up to this time is subject to debate. Towards this end, we
have placed the model of task trade recently developed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008)
in a labor market environment that allows for equilibrium unemployment. We deliberately move
away from the benign environment of smooth labor reallocation by assuming a single-sector
economy. Moreover, we assume that the economy faces perfectly elastic supply in the foreign
labor market. Our approach is general in that it allows for two diﬀerent frictions that may
be responsible for unemployment: Frictions of search and matching à la Pissarides (2000) and
shirking frictions à la Shapiro & Stiglitz (1983). We represent either type of friction through a
wage curve which is confronted with a so-called “task-trade-adjusted” labor demand curve.
Drawing on established literature, our approach assumes that oﬀshoring is based on the
notion of a continuum of tasks and aﬀects labor demand at two margins. At the extensive
margin, an improvement in the technology of oﬀshoring causes job destruction in that certain
tasks that have hitherto been performed by domestic workers are now performed oﬀshore by
foreign workers. At the same time, the cost savings that derive from such oﬀshoring generates
job creation at the intensive margin, meaning additional demand for labor to perform tasks
where domestic labor still commands a cost advantage. Intuitively, with two oﬀsetting eﬀects,
the eﬀect on aggregate employment is ambiguous.
We have identiﬁed conditions under which the job creation at the intensive margin dominates
the destruction that occurs at the extensive margin. Two types of conditions are relevant, both
relating to the technology of oﬀshoring which is represented through a simple cost schedule. This
represents the general idea of task heterogeneity, meaning that some tasks are easier candidates
to oﬀshore provision than others. The local condition has to do with the steepness of this
schedule at the margin. Other things equal a steep schedule favors net job creation. The other
condition has to do with the shape of the schedule over the entire continuum of tasks, and we
call it the interval condition. Other things equal, concentration of task heterogeneity among
high-cost tasks, i.e., at the upper end of the interval, favors net job creation.
We have shown that the conditions necessary for net job creation vary in a systematic way
over the interval of tasks, which in turn implies a potential for non-monotonicity. At early
31stages of oﬀshoring, job destruction at the extensive margin by necessity dominates adjustment
to a technological improvement in the technology of oﬀhsoring. At later stages, however, the
intensive margin of the adjustment may dominate so that oﬀshoring additional tasks in eﬀect
causes net job creation. Given that oﬀshoring is widely seen as a vehicle of job destruction,
these are important conclusions.
We have also demonstrated that oﬀshoring may have counter-intuitive eﬀects also with re-
spect to distribution, meaning that domestic wage income rises relative to non-wage income.
Importantly, our result is diﬀerent from standard Stolper-Samuelson results in that it does not
rely on smooth factor reallocation. Although the principal mechanisms driving this result are
the same as for the employment eﬀects, the suﬃcient condition are more restrictive.
The potential for a non-monotonic adjustment has so far been ignored by the empirical
literature that estimates the employment eﬀect of oﬀshoring. We have shown that our theoretical
result, which at ﬁrst sight seems remote from observable data, may be translated into conditions
that are amenable to empirical observation. This suggests speciﬁc improvements in empirical
speciﬁcations that would allow for non-monotonic adjustment of employment to oﬀshoring.
To shed further light on this potential of non-monotonicity, we have undertaken a numerical
simulation relying on a parameterization of the aforementioned cost schedule. In doing so, we
are able to sharpen our understanding of the characteristics of the oﬀshoring technology that are
responsible for whether or not oﬀshoring more tasks will ever lead to net creation of jobs. These
conditions have to do with the degree of task diversity, both at the margin and over the entire
interval of tasks. But they also have to do with the concentration of such task diversity at the
lower or upper end, respectively, of the task interval. We have described this using the notion
of “task convexity”. Even though our model features a single sector, our numerical simulation
suggests a distinction between two types of industries. In “deep advantage” industries, task
diversity becomes inﬁnite at the upper end of the interval where tasks are diﬃcult to oﬀshore.
Industries with this type of oﬀshoring technology will never lose viability in a certain country
for reasons of cheaper oﬀshoring alone. The same is not true, however, for “shallow advantage”
industries, where task diversity is concentrated in early stages of oﬀshoring and where the cost
of oﬀshoring further tasks converges to a ﬁnite level.
32Appendix
A1 Derivation of Total Labor Cost













s.t. (1 − I) ˙ l = q (θ)V − λ(1 − I)l,
(A.1)
by choosing the optimal number of vacancies, V they want to post each period and, thus,
determining the stock of workers, l, employed in each period. The corresponding Hamiltonian
states
H (l,V,ϕ) = e−rτ
 













where ϕ denotes the co-state variable. The transversality conditions are given by
lim
τ→∞l ≥ 0, lim
τ→∞ϕ ≥ 0, lim
τ→∞lϕ ≥ 0  (A.3)
Computing the ﬁrst order conditions yields
∂H (l,V,ϕ)
∂V
= −(1 − I)κe−rτ + ϕq (θ)












! = − ˙ ϕ  (A.5)
Calculating ˙ ϕ from (A.4) with ˙ θ = 0 in the steady state before substituting into equation (A.5)
yields
F′









t(i)di w∗  (A.6)








which, if compared to equation (5), reveals W = w +
(r+λ)κ
q(θ) .
33A2 Oﬀshoring and income distribution
In this appendix we derive conditions under which an expansion of the range of tasks that are
performed oﬀshore aﬀects the domestic income distribution to the advantage of workers. We
focus on an aggregate measure of income distribution deﬁned as D := π /[w(1 − I)l] = π /(wE)
where π is deﬁned as in (3) above. Replacing proﬁts π, we ﬁnd D := [F(l) − F′(l)l]/(wE).
For the sake of concreteness, we assume that F(l) = f(l,k), where f is a standard linearly
homogeneous production function and k is a second factor, say capital, which is ﬁxed in supply.
Furthermore, let us deﬁne δ := fl (l,k)l/f (l,k). Thus, proﬁts, π = fk (l,k)k, accrue to capital
owners and D is a measure of income distribution between capital and labor. We then have
ˆ D = −( ˆ w + ˆ E) + ˆ fk  (A.8)
The changes in E and I appearing in this equation must be seen as driven by ˆ β < 0, in line
with the above comparative static results. Given that ˆ β < 0 always leads to a higher overall
labor input, ˆ l > 0, it also leads to a higher capital rental π. It then follows that ˆ D < 0 only,
if adjustment involves ˆ E > 0 and ˆ w > 0. Unsurprisingly, the distribution of income changes in
favor of workers only, if oﬀshoring increases domestic employment and the domestic wage rate,
i.e., if the condition of proposition I is satisﬁed.29
Since capital, k, is ﬁxed in supply we have ˆ π = ˆ fk = δˆ l such that equation (A.8) may be rewritten
as













α + δ − 1
 
ˆ E + δ
I
1 − I
ˆ I  (A.10)
In the ﬁrst line we employ ˆ l = ˆ E + [I/(1 − I)] ˆ I, and the second line invokes the general equi-
librium relationship ˆ w = (˜ ωα/ω) ˆ E.30.






> 0, in which case ˆ E > 0. From (A.8) we now recognize that a further necessary
condition is (1+α˜ ω/ω) > δ. By assumption we have 0 < δ < 1, hence this assumption is always
29Note that w and E always move in the same direction.
30For the wage-employment relationship, see the discussion subsequent to equation (32) above.
34fulﬁlled, since α˜ ω/ω ≡ [˜   + (1 − ˜  )η]/[(1 − η)(1 − E)] ≥ 0. ln order to identify a suﬃcient
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The right hand side is always positive. So is the ﬁrst bracketed term on the left, since 0 < δ < 1.
Again, we see that a necessary condition is that oﬀshoring causes net job creation, whence the
second bracketed term is negative as well. As expected, the suﬃcient condition is more likely to
be fulﬁlled at later stages of oﬀshoring where I is large. Moreover, we see that a large elasticity
of labor demand, i.e., a high value of δ, is similarly conducive to ˆ D < 0. Finally, the suﬃcient
condition is more likely to be fulﬁlled for a high value of ˜ ω, the elasticity of the wage rate w
with respect to labor market tightness θ and a low value of ω, the elasticity of labor cost W
with respect to labor market tightness. Notice that ω/α = (1 − η)(1 − E), so the latter eﬀect
looms large for a low value of η and/or a low value of E. Using the ratio π/w to measure income
distribution, the ﬁrst bracketed term on the left then reads as
 
−˜ ω + ω
αδ
 
. Again, a necessary
condition is that this term be negative, in addition to the condition of proposition I. It is obvious
that this set of conditions is more restrictive than if we use D to measure income distribution.
This is intuitive since with this alternative measure we do not take into account the increase in
the wage bill that is due to expansion of unemployment. In other words, instead of looking at
aggregate factor incomes, we look at factor prices.
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